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THE ‘CRUSADER’ COMMUNITY AT ANTIOCH:
THE IMPACT OF INTERACTION WITH
BYZANTIUM AND ISLAM

By T.S. Asbridge

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AT the end of the eleventh century, in the wake of the First Crusade, a Latin principality was established at Antioch, in northern Syria. Founded by the crusade leader Bohemond (1098–c. 1105), this Latin community experienced a period of territorial expansion under the energetic rule of his nephew, Tancred (c. 1105–12), followed by seven years of less aggressive leadership by Roger of Salerno (1113–19). The principality suffered a serious setback with the defeat of its army at the evocatively named battle of the Field of Blood in 1119, during which Prince Roger was slain. Power then passed to a regent, King Baldwin II of Jerusalem (1118–31), until Bohemond II (1126–30), the son of Antioch’s first prince, arrived in northern Syria.

These rulers, drawn from an almost exclusively southern Italian Norman background, laid the foundations of a Latin settlement which

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1 The city of Antioch is now known as Antakya. It lies in Turkey, on the Orontes river, to the south of the Gulf of Alexandretta, only a short distance from the border with Syria. The best map of this area in the period of Latin occupation appears in A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, ed. K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin (Madison, Wisconsin, 1955), p. 305.

2 To date the seminal study of Latin settlement in northern Syria in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is: C. Cahen, La Syrie du nord a l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque d’Antioche (Paris, 1940). The principality has also received some attention from historians of the Normans, most notably; D.C. Douglas, The Norman Achievement 1050–1100 (London, 1969); R. Allen-Brown, The Normans (Woodbridge, 1984). The brief treatments in these works tend to regard the creation of the community at Antioch as an expression of Normanitas. My forthcoming monograph, The Creation of the Principality of Antioch 1098–1130, to be published by Boydell & Brewer, will explore the first three decades of the principality’s history in greater detail. It should be noted that, to date, historians have treated Roger of Salerno as the regent of Antioch. I will argue, in my monograph, that he should actually be styled as prince of Antioch in his own right.
survived in a hostile political environment until 1268. My research into the early history of this settlement has sought to define the nature of the community which they helped to create. They were, of course, not presented with the metaphorical blank sheet of paper. Nor were they able to fashion the principality according to an idealised vision. Instead, military and political expediency compelled them to establish a functional settlement as rapidly as possible.

My aim has been, therefore, to assess the extent to which the principality’s development was influenced by the surrounding Levantine world, western European practice or, perhaps, the founding concepts of crusading. I have also sought to contextualise my findings by comparing the principality with the other Latin settlements created in the Levant, such as the kingdom of Jerusalem, and other medieval frontier societies in areas such as Sicily and Iberia. This article considers what I think makes Antiochene history distinctive; the influence exerted by Islam and eastern Christendom, both within the principality and on its borders. It explores the impact of external military pressure, the survival of Levantine administrative forms and the evidence of Latin Antioch’s early interaction with Islam.

The principality was born into an unusual, if not unique, politico-religious environment. The city of Antioch and the northern reaches of the principality appear to have been largely inhabited by Armenian Christians and Greeks, while to the south the indigenous population was predominantly Muslim. Similarly, Antioch was bordered to the south and east by Muslim powers and to the north-west by the remnants of the Byzantine empire’s holdings in Asia Minor, which stretched along the Mediterranean coast from Attaleia, to Seleucia and on towards Cilicia.

Studying the impact of the Levantine world upon the principality’s development is problematic. There is a shortage of primary material dealing explicitly with cultural interaction. The main Latin narrative sources for early Antiochene history were written by Walter, the chancellor of Antioch between c. 1114 and c. 1122, Fulcher of Chartres, who was based in the kingdom of Jerusalem, and Albert of Aachen, who probably never left western Europe. These accounts reveal little

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3 The detailed prosopographical study, which will appear in my forthcoming monograph on the principality’s early history, indicates that almost all of Antioch’s early settlers were of Norman, if not always southern Italian, background. Although some of his data does not agree with mine, Dr Alan Murray has recently reached a similar conclusion through his own independent study. A. V. Murray, ‘How Norman was the principality of Antioch? Prolegomena to a study of the origins of the nobility of a crusader state’, Family Trees and the Roots of Politics, ed. K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 349–59.

4 C. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, pp. 109–204.

5 Walter the Chancellor, Bella Antiochena, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Innsbruck, 1896). The first Latin translation into English of Walter’s text will shortly be published by Ashgate.
or nothing of the actual relationship between conqueror and conquered and, likewise, generally remain silent regarding Antiochene relations with neighbouring powers which did not involve warfare or conflict. In some ways this fuels our expectations of an environment which was supposedly powered by concepts of crusade and jihad.

Are we, then, to assume that the principality developed no cross-cultural interaction with Islam and eastern Christendom; that there was no diffusion of customs, knowledge, trade; that, in effect, an impermeable frontier, an iron-curtain, existed between the Latins and the world around them? This would, of course, stand in sharp contrast with our knowledge of frontiers elsewhere in medieval Europe. Historians have generally acknowledged that the frontiers of Latin Christendom expanded between the tenth and thirteenth centuries at least in part because of entrepreneurial conquest and immigration, described by Robert Bartlett as 'aristocratic diaspora'. This mode of 'adventurous' expansion, which was certainly not limited to individuals or groups of a Norman background, inevitably produced cross-cultural contact and stimulated a degree of interaction and assimilation across Europe. Did the formation of the Latin community at Antioch follow this pattern in any broad sense, even with the heightened possibility of tension with Islam and the legacy of the First Crusade?

The evidence preserved in Arabic and Armenian accounts does provide glimpses of a more interactive environment in northern Syria. Reviewing the scattered evidence of contact, I suggest that the Latins did not create a community in isolation. That, in fact, the principality

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was profoundly shaped by non-Latin influence. Its internal security and patterns of landholding were probably influenced by the presence of a numerically superior subject population, and Antioch’s administrative framework was affected by eastern practice. The principality also developed important links with the Muslim world around it which culminated in instances of political and military co-operation.

This openness to contact can be compared with other areas of the medieval world, but seems all the more exceptional in the Levantine context given the fact that the Latins may have continued to be influenced by crusade ideology. Antioch was conquered during the First Crusade, an expedition preached on the basis of pious reconquest and religious conflict with Islam, but did the Latins who settled in the Levant still believe themselves to be engaged in an ongoing Holy War with Islam, a war which would bring them the same spiritual benefits as a crusade? The evidence presented by Walter the Chancellor suggests that they did.

Walter certainly used just war terminology in his account, and seems to have made a conscious effort to present Latin military activity within the context of St Augustine of Hippo’s conception of justified violence. He often used variations on the term ‘soldiers of God’ to describe the Latin armies, noted that they had been ‘signed by the Cross’ before battle and asserted that they fought with the ‘weapons of faith’. At times he even presented ‘The Antiochene Wars’ as the spiritual equivalent of the First Crusade, suggesting that their participants gained a similar remission of sins in return for military service.


9 Walter the Chancellor, 1.5, p. 73; 1.1, p. 79; 1.2, p. 82; 1.3, p. 84; 1.5, p. 87.

10 For example, he recorded that after the Antiochene army had made confession in 1115 ‘it was enjoined on each of them by the lord patriarch, instead of a true penance ... that those who would die in the war which was at hand would acquire salvation by his own absolution and also by propitiation of the Lord, while those who returned should all meet at a council arranged for the next feast of All Saints’. Thus, Walter commented, they would be saved ‘through a truce and the Church’s indulgence’ and repeated that
His account is, however, the only extant Latin source for this period to make such extensive use of this terminology. He also naturally wrote from a Christian standpoint, attempting to demonstrate that success and failure in battle was dependent upon God’s will. It is, therefore, accordingly natural that he presented a strong spiritual element within ‘the Antiochene Wars’ and we might question whether this accurately reflected contemporary conviction. With these caveats in mind, it is still worth noting that some evidence does indicate that the Latins continued to espouse the ideology of Holy War during the first decades of settlement in northern Syria. If this were the case then it is all the more remarkable that the Latin community at Antioch was willing to interact at a number of levels with the Levantine world around it.

In terms of internal contact, we know that the principality was a polyglot community, with its Latin population in the minority. Antiochene sources do occasionally make reference to this multicultural society. Walter the Chancellor noted that after an earthquake shook the city of Antioch in 1114 the voices of different nations, ‘Latins, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, strangers and pilgrims’, could be heard in the confusion. Arabic sources suggest that the south-eastern portion of the principality, known as the Jabal as-Summaq, had a largely Muslim population. This can be compared to a Latin ruling class which contained perhaps 700 Frankish knights in this period.

This numerical imbalance between conqueror and conquered had several consequences for the principality’s establishment. Early in its history, Latin domination of northern Syria seems to have been quite precarious and the principality’s frontiers extremely fluid. When the Latins suffered their first serious military defeat in the Levant, at the battle of Harran in 1104, the principality’s subjected population revolted en masse and its frontiers shrank radically as a result. This situation may have stabilised to a degree over time, as the next major defeat at the Field of Blood stimulated less of a wholesale territorial disaster.

The aftermath of this second battle, in which the prince of Antioch was killed, prompted Walter the Chancellor to comment upon contact with the indigenous population in the East. He described the vulnerability of Antioch after the defeat at the Field of Blood, but noted that the Latins ‘feared much more intensely being deceived by the betrayal of enemies within the city than being in any way vulnerable

Bernard ‘pronounced absolution from their sins to the people entrusted to him’. Walter the Chancellor, 1.4–5, pp. 71–2.

Walter the Chancellor, 1.1, p. 63.

Kemal ed-Din, p. 592.

Walter the Chancellor, 11.5, p. 88.

to pressure upon them from external forces'. To cope with the threat of Greek, Syrian and Armenian revolt the Latin Patriarch Bernard organised the defence of the city and ordered 'that the peoples of different nations, wherever they were in the city and wherever they came from, except the Franks, should all remain unarmed and should never venture out of their houses at night without a light'. Walter went on to state in a remarkable aside that he understood why the city's indigenous population might wish to overthrow Latin rule. He wrote, 'Nor was it remarkable if the Antiochenes wanted to return evil for evil ... because that is how the scales of justice change; for indeed the people of Antioch had been deprived of their goods by the force and deviousness of our people and were ... often overcome by despair.'

Thus, in the otherwise partisan opinion of the chancellor, the Latins had exploited the local population in the first twenty years of their rule.

The threat of territorial collapse posed by this large and sometimes hostile subjected population, particularly when combined with the threat of Muslim or Byzantine invasion on the principality's vulnerable frontiers, may have influenced the pattern of Antiochene landholding. The desire to assert Latin authority within the localities could explain why the princes of Antioch allowed powerful and semi-autonomous lordships to develop rapidly within the principality. A group of key landholders can be identified and might be usefully compared to marcher lords in the borderlands between medieval England and Wales.

For example, within two decades the first Latin lords of Cilicia, to the north-west of Antioch, attained considerable power. This region played a major strategic role as a buffer zone between Antioch and the Byzantine empire in this period. A succession of Greek military campaigns to Cilicia, combined with the willingness of its Armenian Christian population to switch allegiance, meant that control of the

15 Walter the Chancellor, ii.8, pp. 95-6.
16 Professor B.Z. Kedar has suggested that Walter characterised Latin rule over the principality's indigenous population as 'intolerable' elsewhere in his account. B.Z. Kedar, 'The subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant', Muslims under Latin Rule, 1100-1300, ed. J.M. Powell (Princeton, NJ, 1990), p. 168. The Latin in this passage reads: 'Graecis namque regnantibus ipsorum imperio servisse convincuntur. eisdem ex Asia propulsis Parthorum regnantium cessere domino; tandem, Deo volente, intolerabiliis succubere Gallorum potestati.' In our forthcoming translation of 'The Antiochene Wars' Susan Edgington and I translate this as: 'For while the Greeks ruled they were persuaded to be enslaved to their empire. When those same people had been driven forth from Asia they had yielded to the dominion of the ruling Persians; eventually, God willing, they succumbed to the irresistible power of the Gauls.' Thus, 'intolerabiliis' is read as 'irresistible', that is undefeatable. We suggest, therefore, that although Walter did comment on Antiochene exploitation of the subjected population he did not do so in the passage previously identified by historians.
region changed hands almost continuously in the first decade of Latin settlement. The fertility of the Cilician plain may also have contributed to the region’s importance. The history of the Latins who held land there in this period is relatively well documented, and this in itself may be an indication of their standing. The Latin rulers of Cilicia were the only landholders whom we know issued charters in their own name in this period. Before 1114 Guy Le Chevreuil (Guy the Goat), the first lord of the region, issued a charter making grants to the abbey of Our Lady of Josaphat in the kingdom of Jerusalem, including provisions for an annual supply of eels to be provided for the monks’ refectory from the fisheries of Mamistra. Guy’s grants were subsequently confirmed in 1114 in a charter issued by Roger of Salerno, prince of Antioch from 1113 to 1119.

A man named Sanso the seneschal appeared as the first lay witness to Guy’s charter, suggesting that Guy had developed some form of local administrative framework within Cilicia. Guy’s importance is also demonstrated by the fact that he was given the honour of commanding the vanguard of the army, alongside Baldwin count of Edessa, in the major battle at Tall Danith in 1115, during which he may have been slain. One Latin source even suggested that, like the rulers of Antioch, he used the title of prince, and was styled ‘prince of Tarsus and Mamistra’. Guy was succeeded by Cecilia, ‘the Lady of Tarsus’, who issued her own charter making grants to the house at Josaphat in 1126. No princely confirmation of this charter survives, but Cecilia herself recorded that she was issuing it ‘with the consent of Bohemond (II) prince of Antioch’.

17 The history of Cilicia’s relationship with Antioch and Byzantium between 1097 and 1110 is rather convoluted. The Cilician towns of Tarsus, Adana and Mamistra were first occupied or contacted by the Latins during the First Crusade. Albert of Aachen, iii.6–16; Ralph of Caen, pp. 633–9; Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum, ed. and transl. R. Hill (London, 1962), iv.10, pp. 24–5; Fulcher of Chartres, i.14, pp. 206–8. Latin bishops of Tarsus and Mamistra were consecrated in December 1099. Ralph of Caen, p. 704. By 1100, however, the region was back in Greek hands, only to be re-occupied by Tancred in April 1101. Ralph of Caen, p. 706. Cilicia continued to be an Antiochene possession until at least 1103, but its Armenian populace had rebelled and accepted Byzantine rule by c. 1104. Anna Comnena, The Alexiad, ed. and transl. S.J. Leib (Paris, 1945), xi.10, p. 41; Ralph of Caen, p. 712. Tancred again achieved at least partial control of the region in c. 1107, but then lost it again to Byzantium in 1108. Anna Comnena, xii.2, pp. 57–8; Albert of Aachen, xi.6. Long-term Latin rule was only established by Tancred between 1109 and 1111. Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 99.


19 Walter the Chancellor, i.6. p. 74.

20 Albert of Aachen, xi.40. It should be noted that as far as we know Albert wrote from western Europe and, therefore, may not provide a reliable record of the titles used in the Levant.
The colourfully named Robert fitz-Fulk the Leper had an extensive lordship. He held the town of Zardana on the eastern frontier, probably from its conquest in 1111.\(^\text{22}\) His estate grew in c.1118, when he became what an Arabic source described as the ‘lord of Saone, Balatanos and the adjoining region’.\(^\text{23}\) These sites were not in border zones but did have considerable strategic significance. Balatanos, known in Arabic as Qal‘at Mehelbe, protected the eastern approach to the port of Jabala, while the impressively fortified Saone defended the region around Latakia and the southern route to Antioch itself.\(^\text{24}\) Robert’s lordship is of particular interest because it was the first in the principality to show evidence of being disposed of on hereditary principle, with his sons William and Garenton succeeding to Zardana and Saone respectively.\(^\text{25}\)

The possession of two key sites on the principality’s eastern frontier, namely al-Atharib from c.1119 and Hisn ad-Dair from 1121, seems to have conferred a special importance upon the man named Alan, especially given the concentration and frequency of military activity between Antioch and Aleppo from 1120 to 1126.\(^\text{26}\) In 1123, during the captivity of Baldwin II, Alan led the army of Antioch on a major raiding campaign into the region around Aleppo. His role as commander of the Antiochene army may reflect his high status within the principality at this point.\(^\text{27}\) In the Jabal as-Summaq, bordering Shaizar and the dependencies of Aleppo, Bonable of Sarmin and Kafartab appears to have been the most important lay landholder. He probably held Sarmin and Kafartab for twelve years or more, and his importance in the area was second only to that of Peter of Narbonne, the bishop of Albarra from 1099, who later became archbishop of Apamea. Bonable donated land to the religious houses of Our Lady of Josaphat in 1114 and the Hospital of Jerusalem in 1118.\(^\text{28}\) The only prominent lordship that was established outside the context of a landed frontier with non-Latins was that amassed by Rainald Masoir in the coastal region of Jabala, Baniyas and Marqab. These sites lay to the south of Antioch, but were close to

\(^{22}\) Ibn al-Athir, p. 278; Kemal ed-Din, p. 621; Chartes de Terre Sainte provenant de l’abbaye de N.D. de Josaphat, pp. 26–7, n. 4.
\(^{23}\) Usamah ibn-Munqidh, p. 149.
\(^{26}\) Walter the Chancellor, ii.2, p. 82; Kemal ed-Din, p. 628.
\(^{27}\) Kemal ed-Din, p. 639.
the frontier with the Latin county of Tripoli. The exact date of his acquisition of Marqab is not entirely clear, but it is certain that by 1119 he had an important military role, leading three companies in the battle of the Field of Blood. By 1127 he had been appointed constable of Antioch, and went on to act as regent in the principality in 1132. He also founded one of the most enduring dynasties in the East, with a lordship based around possession of Marqab, and his descendants continued to play an important role in the history of the principality.

These examples serve to demonstrate the rapid rise of the Antiochene nobility. A number of factors—including an individual's personality—may well have combined to produce this situation, but the combination of internal instability and external threat probably did most to encourage the development of localised power in the principality. There has been a long standing historical debate about the relationship between the king of Jerusalem and his nobility and the rise in the second half of the twelfth century of what some have termed a feudal monarchy. Antioch, with its greater territorial instability, developed a potent landed aristocracy even more rapidly.

A more direct connection can be drawn between the principality's institutional development and the Levantine world into which it was born. Our knowledge of institutions in this early period is, admittedly, extremely limited, so any conclusions can only be viewed as tentative. The princes of Antioch did make use of a range of western European officials—constable, chancellor and chamberlain—drawing particularly from a Norman template. They combined these, however, with pre-existing administrative forms. Unlike the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem,
Antioch had, only a decade before its conquest, been held directly by the Byzantine empire. As a result the principality developed a distinctive institutional framework, particularly influenced by Greek practice in the sphere of local government. Historiographically the kingdom of Jerusalem has dominated the study of Latin administration in the Levant and some historians have tended to assume that its development can act as a universal blueprint for the Latin East. In some areas, however, Antioch followed an independent line.

The most important Latin city official, the duke of Antioch, was probably based on the Greek dux. Although the title of duke existed in the West, the duke in the principality of Antioch owed far more to Byzantine precedents. By contrast, in Jerusalem, which had not been under Byzantine rule, the chief local administrator was a viscount, modelled on a western template. Before the Greeks lost Antioch to the Muslim Sulaiman ibn-Qutulmish in 1084 the city and surrounding region was a theme of the Byzantine empire and had been governed by a duke. In this period a Greek dux represented a local official wielding both military power and a degree of civil authority. Some sense of the powers associated with the principality’s Latin dux can be gleaned from the events of 1115. In that year Roger of Salerno turned to Ralph the duke of Antioch to resolve the problems caused by the recent earthquake damage to the city. They discussed how to organise the repair of Antioch’s walls and towers and then considered what ought to be done by ‘the lord and his warriors in regard to the necessities of war’. A policy was formulated at this meeting, which the duke subsequently passed on to the ‘the greater and the lesser’ (maiores et minores) at the council which he himself called. Walter recorded that after having heard the ‘prince’s decree’ all those present agreed to a course of action, almost certainly that suggested by Roger, whereby the responsibility, probably both financial and physical, for repairing damage to walls and towers would be assigned to those holding land and honours and in accordance with their relative resources.

The fact that the prince first consulted the duke on this matter and that Ralph then called and presided over the resultant council

demonstrates his importance. The degree of autonomy which he enjoyed is, however, open to question. Although Ralph summoned the council, we are told that it was done 'by the enjoined command of the lord prince'. Apparently the prince did not simply tell Ralph what to do during their initial meeting but formed a policy with him, but this solution was then presented to the subsequent council as the 'decree of the prince'. In this case Ralph consulted closely with the prince before implementing any policy and acted primarily as his representative and with his authority. From this single example it is, of course, impossible to form any concrete opinions about the duke of Antioch's ability to exert independent control over the civil government of the city, either in the formulation of civil policy or in the ability to summon a council of the city's officials.

This passage also raises the question of the duke's sphere of administrative influence. First, it is not clear whether he was responsible only for the city itself, or also for the territory in the immediate vicinity. Secondly, was Claude Cahen correct to interpret the evidence presented by Walter the Chancellor as indicative that in 1115 the duke exerted authority only over civil matters? The evidence does not fully support this conclusion, as Roger of Salerno apparently discussed 'the necessities of war' with the duke, perhaps indicating that they addressed the problem of military supplies. This discussion may have centred on the prince's forthcoming campaign or on the actual defence of Antioch, but it raises the possibility that Ralph may have acted as some form of quarter-master.

I suggest, therefore, that the duke of Antioch advised on and implemented the prince's decisions regarding civil matters within the city, while also assisting with the logistical preparations for the prince's forthcoming military campaign. Thus, although the Latins adopted the dux as the premier local official within Antioch, they also appear to have adapted his role to emphasise civil administration as well as military command. Ralph was certainly a significant figure because he appeared in a princely charter issued between 1113 and 1118 as the second witness after Roger of Salerno and his death in 1117–18 was even reported by the Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Qalanisi. By 1134 the office of dux was being used elsewhere in the principality. In that year William of 'Cursibus Altis' the dux of Jabala and Theobald of 'Corizo' the dux of Latakia appeared in a charter issued by Bohemond II's widow, Alice of Jerusalem. It is not possible to date the creation of

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39 Walter the Chancellor, i.2, pp. 65–6.
41 Walter the Chancellor, i.2, p. 65.
43 H. E. Mayer, Varia Antiochena, pp. 110–12, n. 1.
these offices but they may initially have been instituted by Alice to administer her lordship during the struggle for control of Antioch.\textsuperscript{44} Two other officers, praetor and judge, which are mentioned in relation to the civil administration of the city of Antioch, can also probably be connected with Greek precedents.\textsuperscript{45}

The process of adapting the existing apparatus of governance when creating a medieval European community or principality was certainly not unique. For example, institutional development in the kingdom of Norman Sicily was influenced by both Byzantine and Muslim practice, producing offices such as the diwan, and a similar use of a praetor.\textsuperscript{46} In the principality of Antioch this process rapidly produced an administrative framework which differed in some respects from that established in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

I turn now to the principality's interaction with other oriental powers and, in particular, to its links with Islam. On rare occasions the sources do provide us with glimpses of personal relationships which hint at wider contact. For example, the Muslim writer Usamah ibn-Munqidh recalled in his 'Memoirs' that Robert fitz-Fulk the Leper established a close friendship with Tughtegin, the atabeg of Damascus, a story which is, to some extent, confirmed by Walter the Chancellor. This relationship may have been stimulated by Robert's possession of a frontier lordship. Usamah, who had a particular interest in strange twists of fate, probably mentioned this association because it made a good story. He noted that in spite of their friendship, it was Tughtegin who insisted on personally beheading Robert when he was taken captive in 1119. Walter added that Tughtegin then had Robert's skull made into a gold and jewel

\textsuperscript{44} For the most up to date discussion of Alice's rebellion and its consequences see: J. Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land. Relations between the Latin East and the West 1119-1187 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 44–72.

\textsuperscript{45} The office described as 'judge (iudex)' may well have been derived from the Greek krites. In the Byzantine empire the offices of krites and praetor were largely interchangeable. They acted as the chief justice of a theme, responsible for passing judgement and implementing any necessary punishment. H. Glykatzi-Alirweiler, Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire Byzantine aux IX–XI siècles, pp. 67ff. Although there is no specific record of a krites or praetor at Antioch before 1085 the existing reference to a phorologos demonstrates that this administrative function was being carried out. H. Glykatzi-Alirweiler, Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire Byzantine aux IX–XI siècles, p. 85. In Norman Sicily the office of praetor was used to denote a chief judge in control of the municipal judiciary. C. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p. 456. Although it is likely that the praetor and krites of Latin Antioch both developed from Byzantine offices it is not possible to state that in this early period their holders acted as judicial administrators. The evidence does not survive to allow any conclusion beyond the fact that these two offices were involved in the administration of the city of Antioch, and given the change of role undergone by the duke of Antioch from its Byzantine antecedent it would seem foolish to base any argument purely on the evidence of an office's previous responsibilities.

encrusted cup. Alan, lord of al-Atharib on the border with Aleppo, befriended a Muslim living in his town, Hamdan b. Abd al-Rahim, who gave him medical assistance. Perhaps most prominently of all, Roger of Salerno was supposed to have been on close terms with Ilghazi of Mardin, with one Armenian source even claiming that up to 1118 they were 'very intimate friends', though Ilghazi led the Aleppan army which crushed the forces of Antioch and slew Roger on the Field of Blood in 1119.

These are, however, only glimpses of a wider picture. What further can be said about early Latin/Muslim interaction in northern Syria? In order to find visible expressions of contact we must examine Antioch's relations with her two closest and most important Muslim neighbours, focusing in turn upon Aleppo, to the east of Antioch, which was held by the Seljuq Turk Ridwan ibn Tutush from 1095 to 1113, and then Shaizar, on the principality's southern frontier, which was under the control of the Arab dynasty of the Banu-Munqidh at the start of the twelfth century.

The Levantine world, into which the principality of Antioch was born in 1098, was not dominated by any single or united Islamic power. Instead, the Muslim world of northern Syria was extremely fragmented. Both Aleppo and Shaizar were classic examples of this disunity. There was little love lost between the Sunni Turks in Aleppo and the Shi'i Arabs in Shaizar, so these two Muslim cities were natural enemies rather than allies.

The creation of the principality altered the balance of power in northern Syria, but did not unite Aleppo and Shaizar in a common cause. Initially, neither power made any concerted attempt to expel the Latins from Antioch. Instead, to a degree, they accepted the principality as another element in the political make-up of a region...

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48 Hamdan may also have held an administrative post within the principality and been given two villages by Alan. C. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, pp. 343-4; B. Z. Kedar, 'Subjected Muslims under Latin rule', pp. 156-7.

49 Matthew of Edessa, III.78, p. 223.

50 H. Dajani-Shakeel has discussed the series of peace treaties established between Jerusalem and Damascus down to 1153, and alluded to the development of a tribute relationship between these two powers, but did not examine events in northern Syria. H. Dajani-Shakeel, 'Diplomatic relations between Muslim and Frankish ruler 1097-1153 A.D.', Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth Century Syria, ed. M. Shatzmiller (Leiden, 1993), pp. 201-9.

already fraught by power struggles and both were even willing to pursue policies of co-operation and interaction with the Franks. This turbulent political environment not only facilitated the actual creation of the principality, it also enabled the early princes of Antioch to increase their power through diplomatic manoeuvring.

It is helpful to recognise a similarity between this situation and that which existed in the Iberian peninsula during the eleventh century. This era, after the death of al-Mansur in 1002 and the collapse of the caliphate of Cordoba in 1031, characterised as the taifa period, saw the break up of Muslim al-Andalus into a large number of smaller political entities. For much of the eleventh century these taifa states were embroiled in inter-Muslim power struggles, providing an opportunity for expansion to the surviving Christian states in the north of the peninsula. In this early period of the Reconquest the Christians sought to exploit Muslim weakness and factionalism to increase their own wealth and territory.

One of their primary avenues in this pursuit was the extraction of regular tribute payments (parias) from individual taifas who either sought to avoid attack or wanted protection from fellow Muslims and other Christian states. Fernando I (1036–65) and Alfonso VI (1065–1109) of Leon-Castile were particularly skilful exponents of this practice. During their successive reigns they established the payment of parias from the Muslim cities of Granada, Zaragoza, Badajoz, Seville and Toledo. These payments could represent significant transfers of wealth – it is estimated that in 1074 Alfonso VI gathered c. 70,000 gold dinars from parias – and thus could fund Christian armies in the field. They also created a relationship of dependence in which a taifa's need for protection afforded its Christian defender increasing influence and authority within that city. This process saw its fullest expression in the peaceful occupation of Toledo by Alfonso VI in 1085 after a long period of parias exploitation, a crucial step forward in the Reconquest as a whole.

In his study on ‘The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain’, B. Reilly wrote that this parias system ‘had no counterpart elsewhere in western Europe’. This may be true for the West, at least in terms of Christian/Muslim contact, but does not hold for the Latin

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54 B. Reilly, The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, p. 58.
East because it is evident that both the nature of the Muslim weakness in the Levant and the Frankish method of exploitation have marked similarities with the world of the Reconquista.

By exploiting Muslim weakness and applying direct military pressure Antioch was rapidly able to establish its own system of regular tribute payments from Aleppo and Shaizar. This process not only enriched the principality while weakening its neighbours’ financial resources, but also created a relationship of interdependence, from which both sides could potentially benefit, and which culminated in instances of Latin/Muslim military co-operation. Thus, we can observe a Latin community which existed not in isolation, but in regular, if generally exploitative, contact with Islam.

Aleppo can serve as a case study for the development and impact of tribute links. The city was Antioch’s closest Muslim neighbour, with only 90 km separating the two, and potentially its most dangerous enemy. The Muslim disunity of the early twelfth century often left Aleppo politically isolated from other powers in northern Syria, such as Shaizar and Damascus. After 1113 the city was further weakened by the series of succession crises which followed the death of Ridwan ibn Tutush. The early princes of Antioch exploited and exacerbated this frailty by pursuing an aggressive policy of territorial expansion eastwards, towards Aleppo. From 1105 Aleppo began to sue for peace, perhaps confirming a five-year truce in return for a single tribute payment. By 1111 a regular tribute payment to the principality of 20,000 dinars had been established. When Roger of Salerno became prince of Antioch in 1113 one of his first actions was to renew this tribute relationship formally.

The Latin/Muslim contact established by this process produced an atmosphere of interdependence. The first, and perhaps most striking, expression of this was the military co-operation between Antioch and Aleppo in 1108–9. The basic context of this collaboration was an inter-Latin dispute over possession of the county of Edessa. During the Latin defeat at Harran, mentioned above, Baldwin of Le Bourcq, count of Edessa and Joscelin of Courtenay, a major landholder in the county, had both been taken prisoner and they remained in captivity until

55 In some sense the Latins were also following Byzantine precedent in this regard because the Greeks had in the early eleventh century extracted tribute payments from the Muslim powers of northern Syria. A History of the Crusades, vol. 1, p. 91.

56 Kemal ed-Din, p. 602.

57 Kemal ed-Din, pp. 596–7.

58 Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 106; Kemal ed-Din, p. 598; Ibn al-Athir, p. 298. Ibn al-Athir recorded a tribute of 32,000 pieces of gold.

59 Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 132.
During this period Tancred, ruler of Antioch, took control of Edessa and on Baldwin's release he proved reluctant to renounce his authority over the city. In 1108 Tancred met Baldwin in an inconclusive battle. In this conflict Aleppo troops fought alongside the principality's forces, while Baldwin had, through other means, also secured the assistance of Chavli, the Muslim ruler of Mosul, far to the East. The squabble over possession of Edessa was eventually resolved by negotiation.!

This was, however, not the end of hostilities or interdependence, as the forces of both Antioch and Edessa subsequently participated on different sides in a conflict between Ridwan of Aleppo and Chavli of Mosul. In 1109 relations between them had deteriorated to such an extent that the latter led a force to attack Aleppo. In the light of this threat, Ridwan appealed to Tancred for assistance, and Chavli, too, sought Baldwin's military support. Thus, in the resultant battle, the combined forces of Mosul and Edessa met an army, commanded by Tancred, which consisted of 1,500 Antiochene knights, 600 Aleppo horsemen and an unspecified number of infantry.

Antioch and Aleppo joined forces again in 1115. At that point Ilghazi of Mardin, and Tughtegin of Damascus, had seized temporary control of Aleppo, hoping to ensure that the city did not fall into the hands of the army sent by the sultan of Baghdad under the command of Bursuq of Hamadan. They also decided to seek an alliance with Roger of Salerno. In the early summer he advanced from Antioch to al-Atharib, where he was contacted by Ilghazi and Tughtegin. Initially, the Latins were alarmed by the gathering of these two Muslim rulers at Aleppo, and Roger actually left Antioch anticipating a military confrontation. Instead, he received an offer of a military alliance against Bursuq. The exact nature of this agreement, in terms of military commitment or numbers of troops, is not clear. At first Roger, Ilghazi and Tughtegin appear to have all returned to keep watch from their respective cities, but later a contingent from Damascus and perhaps also Aleppo joined the Antiochene army for a short period.

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60 Ralph of Caen, p. 710; Albert of Aachen, ix.39-41; Fulcher of Chartres, ii.28, pp. 473-4; Matthew of Edessa, iii.18, p. 193.
61 Ibn al-Athir, pp. 262-3; Matthew of Edessa, iii.39, p. 201; Albert of Aachen, x.38; Fulcher of Chartres, ii.28, pp. 479-81.
63 Ibn al-Athir, p. 296; Kemal ed-Din, p. 608.
64 Tughtegin also established a treaty with King Baldwin I of Jerusalem. H. Dajani-Shakeel, 'Diplomatic relations between Muslim and Frankish ruler 1097-1153 A.D.', p. 205.
65 Walter the Chancellor, i.2, p. 66.
66 Walter the Chancellor, i.2, pp. 66-7; i.4, p. 70; Fulcher of Chartres, ii.53, pp. 582-3; Matthew of Edessa, iii.70, p. 219; Usamah ibn-Munqidh, p. 149.
Contemporary Latin writers based in the Levant often presented military alliances with Islam in a poor light. Fulcher of Chartres did his best to minimalise Baldwin of Le Bourcq's role in the 1108 pact with Chavli, transferring responsibility for the use of Muslim troops to Joscelin of Courtenay. Fulcher probably decided to shield Baldwin from criticism because he was writing or revising his account during Baldwin's reign as king of Jerusalem. When describing the alliance between Antioch, Aleppo and Damascus in 1115 Walter the Chancellor noted that Tughtegin wished 'to be united with the Christians in a pretended peace, so that he might lead them to disaster', and went on to comment that the pact later dissolved because God 'wished to break up the alliance of the devil with our people'. These examples suggest that there was some tension between the reality of Near Eastern political and military affairs and the ideals espoused by contemporary writers.

Latin involvement in Aleppan affairs continued to increase in the years leading up to 1119. In this period the city had been reduced by internal factionalism to a position of perilous insecurity, and seemed ready to succumb to the constant threat of conquest by other Muslim powers. Antioch exploited this political turmoil by offering the prospect of alliance in return for ever more burdensome financial and territorial concessions, such as possession of al-Qubba, to the south of Aleppo, and the right to extract duty from those pilgrims who passed through the town on their way to Mecca. In 1117 Roger intervened to protect Aleppo, which at this point was almost powerless to defend itself, and so prevented the ruler of Damascus from occupying the city.

This level of dependence could easily have resulted in an actual Frankish occupation of Aleppo, which would have secured Latin domination of northern Syria. In 1119, however, the Muslim ruler of Mardin, Il-ghazi, took control of Aleppo and rejected the policy of alliance with Antioch, deciding instead to embark upon an aggressive military campaign against the principality. This culminated in the disastrous Antiochene defeat at the Field of Blood. For over a decade, however, Antioch had benefited both financially and strategically from the establishment of tributes and alliances with Aleppo, coming desperately close to controlling the city in much the same way as military dependence and parias payments had led to the fall of Toledo in the

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67 Fulcher of Chartres, ii.28, pp. 479–81.
68 Walter the Chancellor, i.2, pp. 66–7.
69 Walter the Chancellor, i.4, p. 70.
70 Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 156; Kemal ed-Din, p. 612.
71 Kemal ed-Din, p. 613.
72 T. S. Asbridge, 'The significance and causes of the battle of the Field of Blood', pp. 301–16.
eleventh century. In Iberia this Christian advance was followed by the advent of the Almoravids, a fundamentalist Muslim sect from North Africa, who reinvigorated al-Andalus. In northern Syria Ily-ghazi renewed resistance to the Latins before Aleppo fell and the initial cycle of exploitation and interdependence was broken.

In 1111 Antioch also established a system of regular tribute payments of 10,000 dinars from the Banu-Munqidh of Shaizar, to the south. Indeed, Walter the Chancellor described the city as a ‘tributary’ which ‘served our men’. This represents the only contemporary Latin acknowledgement that northern Syrian Muslims paid tribute to the Franks. A period of particularly close co-operation with Shaizar can be observed in the 1120s. At this point it was the Latins’ turn to be on the back foot. With the death of Roger in 1119 the principality was thrown into a succession crisis. It was left to King Baldwin II of Jerusalem to act as regent until 1126, but Latin prospects briefly deteriorated even further when he, too, was taken captive in June 1123 and ended up as a prisoner of the new ruler of Aleppo, Timurtash. The importance of Antioch’s tribute relationship with Shaizar came to the fore in the attempts to secure Baldwin’s release from captivity.

The local Muslim writer, Usamah ibn-Munqidh, recorded that Shaizar played an important role in these events, noting that the king was brought to the city so that the Munqidh ‘might act as an intermediary in determining the price of his ransom’. Another Arabic source recorded that the emir of Shaizar acted as the mediator between Baldwin and his captor, Timurtash, during this arbitration. The emir even went so far as to send hostages of his own to Aleppo so that the king could be moved to Shaizar. Baldwin remained there for some time, while arrangements were made for Latin hostages to be handed over to the Munqidh as guarantee of his promises to Timurtash, and an initial payment of 20,000 pieces of gold was made. Thus, when Baldwin was actually released on 30 August 1124, and immediately broke his agreement with Aleppo, an unusual situation existed, whereby Timurtash held Munqidh hostages in Aleppo, while Latin hostages were held at Shaizar. Neither of these groups were released before Baldwin led a campaign to attack Aleppo itself later that year.

Usamah also recorded that around this time Baldwin released the Banu-Munqidh of Shaizar from the tribute owed to Antioch. Why

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73 D. Lomax, *The Reconquest of Spain*, pp. 68–73.
74 Ibn al-Qalanisi, p. 99; Ibn al-Athir, p. 279. Ibn al-Athir recorded that Shaizar’s tribute was 4,000 pieces of gold.
75 Walter the Chancellor, 1.2, p. 67.
76 Usamah ibn-Munqidh, p. 150.
77 Kemal ed-Din, pp. 644–5.
78 Usamah ibn-Munqidh, p. 150.
did the king and the emir of Shaizar co-operate in this way? Usamah, who recorded both events, does not enable us to provide a sure answer. Within his text he placed the involvement of the Banu-Munqidh in the negotiations of 1124 immediately before his report that Baldwin cancelled Shaizar's tribute. On this basis it might be assumed that the king exempted the Munqidhs from this payment out of gratitude for their help. The cancellation of this debt may even have been a precondition of the Banu-Munqidh involvement in 1124, a concession which they extracted from the king. Usamah certainly recorded that the Banu-Munqidh 'had him (Baldwin) under great obligation to them' because of the part they played in organising his release. This would explain both Baldwin's and the Banu-Munqidh's actions, although it must be noted that Shaizar may have also hoped to gain something from the assistance it provided to Timurtash of Aleppo. However, in a manner typical to the rather random nature of his work, Usamah confused the matter by suggesting that Baldwin actually cancelled Shaizar's tribute obligations when he first became regent of Antioch in 1119. If this were the case, what could Baldwin's motive have been? As king of Jerusalem and regent of Antioch, Baldwin's resources were severely stretched, in terms of time, money and manpower. He could not neglect northern Syria, but equally he could not fight on all fronts within the principality. The events of the 1120s seem to indicate that he decided to concentrate on the threat from Aleppo. This may have been the reason why he released Shaizar from its debt. Although he may have needed money, there was no guarantee that Shaizar would pay quickly. Improving relations with the Banu-Munqidh, however, would have helped to secure the principality's southern border, allowing Baldwin to deal with the eastern frontier. If this were the case, the king's cultivation of good relations with Shaizar demonstrated both a shrewd understanding of strategic necessity and an ability to manipulate events through diplomatic means. Usamah's confused account of events makes it impossible to affirm categorically what really occurred. There can, however, be no doubt that Baldwin did have a close relationship with Shaizar in the 1120s. Usamah noted that in this period the Banu-Munqidh 'became very influential in the affairs of Antioch'.

Diplomatic relations with the Banu-Munqidh do not seem to have been too badly damaged by the king's duplicity over the terms of his release from captivity in 1124 because Usamah went on to record that when Bohemond II arrived at Antioch in 1126 to take up his inheritance, Baldwin 'was receiving an envoy' from Shaizar. Bohemond died in

79 Usamah ibn-Munqidh, p. 150.
80 Usamah ibn-Munqidh, p. 150.
1130, perpetuating a further succession crisis, and very little is known of his rule.

Through an examination of tribute systems – one of the only visible modes of interaction, not wholly based on warfare – it is evident that close Latin/Muslim relations did develop in northern Syria during the first decades of Frankish settlement. This culminated in periods of military co-operation and political interdependence, entangling the principality and its Muslim neighbours in each other’s affairs. This is not to suggest that Antioch sought long-term peace and co-operation with Islam. Threat and exploitation were still the driving forces behind the implementation and enforcement of tributes. Neither should we imagine that cross-cultural tribute payments were unusual in the overall picture of medieval Europe. In England, for example, Danegeld was used to combat the Danish threat. What is striking is that similar forms of contact could exist in such diverse settings and that even a Catholic community, recently established by a crusading army, interacted with the surrounding Muslim world.

As a postscript it is evident that over the next century Antioch continued to interact with the Islamic and Eastern Christian Levantine world. In the 1180s the Muslim Mansur b. Nabil was the qadi of Jabala, acting as chief administrator of the principality’s Islamic population.81 By this point, however, the balance of power had turned in favour of Islam, with the Muslim world united from the Nile to the Euphrates by Saladin. Latin Antioch managed to survive this period of Islamic resurgence at least in part because of its willingness to reach diplomatic accommodations with Saladin both before and after the fateful battle of Hattin.82 Towards the end of the twelfth century Antioch also perpetuated increasingly close links with the Armenian Christian rulers of Cilicia, culminating in marriage alliances and the accession of the half-Latin, half-Armenian Prince Raymond-Roupen in 1216.83

During the first, formative decades of its existence the principality of Antioch established administrative frameworks and patterns of land-holding which were influenced by Byzantine precedent and the presence of a predominantly non-Latin population. It also formed diplomatic links with the neighbouring Muslim powers of Aleppo and Shaizar. The principality certainly needs to be examined as a distinct entity rather than an aside to the history of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Antioch developed a potent landed aristocracy more rapidly than Jerusalem, incorporated Byzantine institutions into its local government which

cannot be found elsewhere in the Latin East and interacted and co-operated with Islam more actively than any of its Latin neighbours in this early period. If we can describe the principality as a 'crusader' community, one in which the ideals of Holy War continued to be espoused, then it stands, in comparison to Iberia, Sicily or the wider world of western Christendom, as a significant and distinctive example of the tensions between religious ideology and political reality. Even in the context of the Near East and in the shadow of the crusading movement this frontier community began to partially assimilate and co-operate with the Levantine world within a few years of its creation.